Regina v Iqbal; [2010] WLR (D) 23

CRIME — Sentence — Confiscation order — Postponement of confiscation proceedings — Jurisdiction — Time limit — Permitted period of two years from date of conviction — Whether application for postponement or extension of postponement may be made after end of permitted period

Regina v Iqbal

[2010] WLR (D) 23

CA: Hooper LJ, Openshaw J, Judge Nicholas Cooke QC: 3 Feb 2010

An application for the time for proceedings for a confiscation order to be postponed, or for a postponement to be extended, may be made only during the permitted period provided for in s 14 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division so held on 3 February 2010 when dismissing an appeal by the prosecution under s 31 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 against a decision on 1 July 2009 in the Crown Court at Bradford (Judge Scott) that the court had no jurisdiction to proceed with an application for a confiscation against the defendant, Zaffar Iqbal, in relation to his conviction on 10 January 2006 of conspiracy to supply class A drugs.

HOOPER LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said that the defendant had been convicted on 10 January 2006 of conspiracy to supply heroin. Proceedings for a confiscation order had been listed on 21 May 2007, but had been adjourned for re-listing in three months’ time before the original sentencing judge. That had not happened and the next hearing appeared to have been that on 1 July 2009. The issue was whether, absent a court order postponing the proceedings, there was jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution’s application for a confiscation order. It was clear from s 14 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 that a postponement, or extension of a postponement, could be made only by an order made by the Crown Court. The section provided for a “permitted period”, which was normally, as in this case, two years starting with the date of conviction: s 14(5). No order had been made, and no application had been made, during the permitted period. The prosecution contended that an application could be made at any time because the words “must not end” in s 14(3) should be read as “should not end”. The court did not accept that, but in any event s 14(8) was another obstacle in the prosecution’s way, as its clear intention was to limit the circumstances in which there could be an extension beyond the permitted period. The defendant submitted that the intention of Parliament was that proceedings would be heard within two years unless there were exceptional circumstances. On construction of s 14, especially s 14(3) and (8), it was clear that a longer period might be available to the prosecution but an application for postponement, or extension of postponement, could be made only during the permitted period. As the sentencing judge had correctly concluded that there was no jurisdiction, the question whether there were exceptional circumstances within s 14(4), on which he had also ruled against the prosecution, was academic.

Appearances: Mark Lucraft QC and Tahir Khan (instructed by Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office) for the prosecution; Simon Farrell QC and Balbir Singh (instructed by Petherbridge Bassra, Bradford) for the defendant.

Reported by: Philip Ridd, solicitor.