| EXTRADITION — European arrest warrant — Specialty — Warrant requesting extradition of offender in respect of conviction of blackmail — Warrant further alleging defendant unlawfully at large and in breach of bail — Whether Bail Act offence disclosed in warrant — Whether judge in Crown Court having power to sentence defendant for Bail Act offence — Extradition Act 2003, s 146(3)(b)
R v Seddon; [2009] WLR (D) 88
CA: Hughes LJ, King J, Judge Gordon: 10 March 2009
In a European arrest warrant which sought a defendant’s return to this jurisdiction as a convicted person for the extradition offence of blackmail an allegation that the defendant was unlawfully at large and in breach of bail did not amount to “an offence disclosed by the information provided … in respect of” the offence of blackmail for the purposes of s 146(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003.
The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, so held when allowing an appeal by Neil Seddon, pursuant to s 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 against his conviction at the Crown Court at Minshull Street, Manchester before Judge Thomas, on a plea of guilty to failing to surrender to custody, contrary to s 6 of the Bail Act 1976.
On 15 October 2001 at the Crown Court at Minshull Street the appellant had pleaded guilty to an offence of blackmail. Sentence was postponed until the conclusion of the trial of the appellant’s co-defendants. The appellant went to Spain and failed to appear at court for sentence. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest and subsequently the appellant was extradited from Spain on the basis of a warrant, issued under Pt 3 of the 2003 Act, which sought the appellant’s return as a person unlawfully at large having been convicted of an extradition offence (blackmail) for the purpose of sentence and referred to the fact that the appellant had failed to answer his bail at the Crown Court and that a bench warrant had been issued for his arrest. It did not assert that the appellant was accused of an offence in relation to his breach of bail, nor seek the appellant’s return in respect of any such offence. On his return to Manchester the judge ruled that he could deal with the appellant not only for the blackmail offence but also for an offence contrary to s 6 of the Bail Act 1976 of failing to surrender to bail.
S 146 of the Extradition Act 2003 provides: “(2) The person may be dealt with in the United Kingdom for an offence committed before his extradition only if— (a) the offence is one falling within subsection (3) … (3) The offences are— …(b) an offence disclosed by the information provided to the category 1 territory in respect of that offence …”
HUGHES LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said that the issue in the appeal was the extent of the rule of specialty which was preserved by the Extradition Act 2003 in relation to offenders extradited from category 1 territories, that is European Union territories; ie whether the judge had any power to deal with the Bail Act offence or whether he was confined to the blackmail offence. What was in question was the construction of s 146(3)(b) of the 2003 Act. The 2003 Act gave effect to the European Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002. Framework Decisions were binding on member states as to the result to be achieved but left to national authorities the choice of form and methods. Art 27 of the Framework Decision provided that a person surrendered might not be prosecuted or sentenced for an offence prior to his surrender other than that for which he had been surrendered. The difficulty in the present case was because the language of s146(3) of the 2003 Act was different from that of art 27. The specialty principle was however plainly recognised in s 146. In the present case the request for extradition contained no indication whatever that the appellant was required in relation to the Bail Act offence; there was merely a statement that he had failed to answer to bail. The question therefore, looking at the terms of s 146(3)(b), was whether the Bail Act offence committed by the appellant was “an offence disclosed by the information provided to [Spain] in respect of [the extradition] offence”? In their Lordships’ judgment the reference to the appellant having been unlawfully at large did not amount to an assertion that he had committed a Bail Act offence. Exercising the duty to construe the section as far as possible in accordance with the international obligation which this country had undertaken through the Framework Decision the section did not permit the appellant to be dealt with in Manchester for the Bail Act offence which was wholly extraneous to the blackmail offence and to which there was only a passing reference. The conviction for failing to surrender would be quashed. |
Appearances: Clive Nicholls QC and Christopher Daw (Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for the appellant; James Lewis QC and Nigel Booth (Crown Prosecution Service, Manchester) for the Crown; David Perry QC (Treasury Solicitor) for the Secretary of State for the Home Department, intervening.
|
