| CRIME — Practice — Time limit — Summary proceedings — Failure to make monthly declarations to HM Revenue and Customs concerning cross border trade— Start of time limit related to knowledge of Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions — Whether matters within knowledge of officers of HM Revenue and Customs to be imputed to Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions — Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s 146A(3) (as inserted by Finance Act 1989, s. 16(1)(4))
Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions v N E Plastics Ltd [2008] WLR(D); [2008] WLR (D) 236
QBD : Maurice Kay LJ and Blake J : 11 July 2008
For the purposes of s 146A(3) Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 matters within the knowledge of officers of HM Revenue and Customs were not to be imputed to the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions, so that the period for the commencement of summary proceedings started only when sufficient evidence to warrant proceedings came to the attention of the Director or his staff.
The Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division so held when allowing an appeal by the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions by way of case stated from a decision of Southend Magistrates’ Court on 5 November 2007 that informations against the defendant, N E Plastics Ltd, had been laid after the expiry of the time limit provided by s 146A(3).
MAURICE KAY LJ said that VAT legislation placed a legal obligation on businesses which have dealings in goods across European boundaries to make monthly declarations, and failure to comply was an offence under reg 6 of the Statistics of Trade (Customs and Excise) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/2790). Informations had been laid against the defendant in respect of failures to make declarations for the 16 months from March 2005 to June 2006. Under s 146A(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 “proceedings for a summary offence shall not be commenced after the end of the period of three years beginning with [the day on which the offence was committed] but, subject to that, may be commenced at any time within six months from the date sufficient evidence to warrant proceedings came to the knowledge of the prosecuting authority”. The informations had been laid within time, unless, as the defendant submitted, knowledge of officers of HM Revenue and Customs was to be imputed to the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions. The defendant conceded that the plain meaning of s 146A(3) was to the contrary, but submitted that that interpretation was contrary to the intention of Parliament that proceedings should be efficient and expeditious, that delay was contrary to the terms of the Code for Prosecutors, and that it could not be right to permit HM Revenue and Customs to delay up to three years before passing the file to the Director. The submissions were attractive but could not be accepted. The Parliamentary intention was to establish prosecutorial independence from HM Revenue and Customs. Authority did not support a departure from the plain meaning. Delay was irrelevant to the point of statutory construction: a remedy for delay would be a matter for an application to stay proceedings for abuse of process.
BLAKE J gave a concurring judgment.
|
