| LIMITATION OF ACTION — Personal injuries — Time limit, power to override — Defendant sentenced to life imprisonment for sexual assault — Claimant not bringing civil claim because of defendant’s impecuniosity — Defendant’s win on National Lottery following release on licence — Claimant bringing civil claim after expiry of limitation period — Whether court should exercise discretion to disapply time limit in favour of claimant — Limitation Act 1980, ss 11, 33
A v Hoare (No 2) [2008] EWHC 1573 (QB); [2008] WLR (D) 230
QBD: Coulson J: 8 July 2008
In considering the factors relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to extend the limitation period beyond that specified in s 11 of the Act, the reasons for the delay in issuing proceedings, and its potentially prejudicial effect, mattered more than the length of the delay, and it was reasonable to delay on account of the defendant’s impecuniosity.
Coulson J so held when exercising the discretion under s 33 of the 1980 Act to direct that the three-year limitation period under s 11 of the Act should not apply to an action brought by the claimant, A, against the defendant, Iorworth Hoare, for damages for assault and battery, and giving directions for a trial to take place.
The claimant, who had been subjected by the defendant to a serious sexual attack, as a result of which she had suffered severe post-traumatic stress disorder, had commenced civil proceedings 16 years and 10 months following the assault, shortly after her discovery that the defendant, who had been convicted and given a life sentence, had been released from prison on licence and won £7m in a national lottery. By order of the House of Lords [2008] 2 WLR 311 the case had been remitted to a judge of the Queen’s Bench Division to decide whether the discretion under s 33 should be exercised in the claimant’s favour.
COULSON J said that it had been decided in A v Hoare [2008] 2 WLR 311 that s 11 of the 1980 Act applied to claims for damages in tort arising from trespass to the person, including sexual assault. In applying the discretion to extend the specified limitation period, the court should take into account all the factors specified in s 33(3), and all the circumstances of the case relevant to the decision, and conduct a balancing exercise in respect of them. The delay in the present case had been very long, but what mattered most was not the length of the delay but the reasons for it. There was no reported authority in which the court had been asked to exercise its s 33 discretion on the ground that the claim had not been commenced earlier because the defendant had not previously been in a position to meet a substantial award of damages. Although the claimant had received an award from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, it appeared from the evidence that, at the time of the defendant’s conviction, no thought had been given to pursuing the defendant in the civil courts because he would not have been in a position to satisfy any judgment made against him. It was reasonable for the claimant not to commence proceedings while the defendant was impecunious. She had acted promptly and reasonably once she became aware of the significant change in the claimant’s financial position. The underlying tort, the factual basis of which could not be disputed, had been regarded as so serious by the trial judge as to justify the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. Its commission had created the very circumstances of the defendant’s imprisonment and consequent impecuniosity which prevented the claimant from bringing her claim earlier. In the exceptional circumstances of the case it would be inequitable not to allow the claim to proceed.
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