| ROAD TRAFFIC — Breath specimen for analysis — Reasonable excuse for failure to provide specimen — Medical condition preventing provision of specimen — Whether obligation to notify police officer requiring specimen about medical condition — Road Traffic Act 1988, s 7(1)(6) — Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, Sch 2
Piggott v Director of Public Prosecutions; [2008] WLR (D) 44
QBD: Moses LJ and Sullivan J: 8 February 2008
There was no obligation on an individual, required under s 7(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to provide a specimen of breath for analysis, to declare a medical condition which might make it difficult or impossible for the individual to meet the requirement.
The Queen's Bench Divisional Court so held when allowing an appeal by case stated from a decision of the South Yorkshire Justices sitting at Sheffield, by which the defendant was convicted of the offence, under s 7(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Sch 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, of failing, without reasonable excuse, to provide a specimen of breath when required to do so under s 7(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
The defendant, arrested on suspicion of being unfit to drive through consumption of drink or drugs, was required to provide a specimen of breath. She made four attempts to do so, but failed to provide sufficient breath. Subsequently a specialist in respiratory medicine gave an opinion, accepted by the justices, that there was a medical reason for the failure, namely that the defendant suffered from asthma and hyperventilation syndrome. The justices concluded that the defendant told the officer who required her to provide a specimen that she did not suffer from any relevant condition but may have mentioned her condition to the arresting officer who was also present. The justices held, following Teape v Godfrey [1986] RTR 213, that the defendant had been under a duty to inform the officer who made the requirement to provide a breath specimen of her medical condition, and that the defendant had not therefore had a reasonable excuse for the failure to provide a specimen.
SULLIVAN J said that it was implicit in the case stated that the justices had rejected the Crown's contention that the defendant had not been trying, or making any real effort, to provide a breath sample. The main question was, therefore, whether the defendant had been under any obligation to tell the police officer who made the requirement to provide a breath specimen about her medical condition. No such obligation was expressly provided for in s 7 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The Crown argued that such an obligation should be implied in order to make the statutory scheme workable. That argument had force, but there were limitations in practical terms. Moreover, whatever the practical difficulties, they did not warrant implication of the requirement under consideration: the statute created criminal offences and the court should not graft in additional obligations. The view to the contrary, expressed in Teape v Godfrey, and later criticised, should not be followed. Failure to have mentioned a medical condition might, in other cases, result in the justices concluding as a matter of evidence that there had been a wilful refusal to provide a specimen.
MOSES LJ gave a concurring judgment. |
