| TORT — Battery — Self-defence — Whether belief in necessity to act to be both honestly held and reasonable — Whether battery claim permissible for vindicatory purposes only
Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25; [2008] WLR (D) 126
HL (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Carswell and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury): 23 April 2008
A civil claim against the police for battery by the family of an unarmed man shot dead during a police raid was not to be struck out despite the responsible officer's acquittal of murder because, in civil law, a plea of mistaken self-defence required not only that the assailant's mistaken belief that he had been under threat had been honestly held, as required by the criminal law, but also that it had been reasonably held. Moreover, the claim could proceed even though, as the police had admitted liability for negligence and agreed to meet all damages flowing from the incident, a finding of liability on the battery claim would not result in any additional damages being awarded.
The House of Lords so held (Lord Carswell and Lord Neuberger dissenting in part) in dismissing an appeal by the Chief Constable of Sussex Police from the order of the Court of Appeal (Sir Anthony Clarke MR and Arden LJ; Auld LJ dissenting in part) [2007] 1 WLR 398 allowing an appeal by James Ashley Junior and James Ashley Senior, the son and father of the deceased man, against the decision of Dobbs J to strike out their claim for battery against the Sussex Police in respect of his killing.
LORD SCOTT said that self-defence to a civil law claim for battery, in a case where the assailant acted in the mistaken belief that he was in imminent danger of being attacked, required that the mistaken belief was not only honestly but also reasonably held. Under criminal law, even if the mistake was an unreasonable one, if the defendant had been genuinely labouring under it, he was entitled to rely on it. No one was to be punished for the consequences of an honest mistake. But the function of the civil law of tort was different, to protect the rights that every person was entitled to assert against others and to strike a balance when those rights conflicted. It was one thing to say that if A's mistaken belief was honestly held he should not be punished by the criminal law. It would be quite another to say that A's unreasonably held mistaken belief was sufficient to justify the law in setting aside B's right not to be subjected to physical violence by A. Since the police would have to show in the civil claim that the officer's mistaken belief had been reasonably held, the judge had been wrong to strike it out as having no real prospect of success. It had also been argued that the claim should not be allowed to proceed because, in view of the chief constable's acceptance of responsibility for any damages which could be proved to have flowed from the incident, a finding of liability on the battery claim would not add anything to the quantum of damages recoverable. However, although the principal aim of an award of compensatory damages was to compensate for the loss suffered, there was no reason in principle why they should not also fulfil a vindicatory purpose. Nor would a civil trial amount to an unlawful collateral attack on the police officer's acquittal. It raised issues different from those on which the criminal charges against him had turned.
LORD BINGHAM and LORD RODGER delivered concurring opinions. LORD CARSWELL and LORD NEUBERGER delivered opinions agreeing as to the civil test for self-defence but dissenting on whether the claim should be allowed to proceed.
|
