| CRIME — Sentence — Imprisonment — Whether power to sentence for further offences beyond minimum period when prisoner serving indeterminate sentence — Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c 43), s 154 — Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c 44), s 264
R v Hills; R v Pomfret; R v Davies; [2008] WLR (D) 251
CA: Latham LJ, Grigson and Macduff JJ: 17 July 2008
There was no practical reason why an order should not be made requiring an offender to serve an additional period of imprisonment other than the minimum period before being considered for parole where there had been a planned, deliberate and serious act of violence, in circumstances which fully justified a significant sentence of imprisonment.
The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, so held when dismissing appeals by Christopher Hills (against his three-year sentence consecutive to his indeterminate sentence given on 31 July 2007 at Teesside Crown Court before Judge Spittle, for attempting to escape from lawful custody) and Marvin Pomfret (against his sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum of six years given on 29 February 2008 at Birmingham Crown Court before Mr Recorder Elsom, for wounding with intent) and allowing an appeal by Stephen Davies (against his sentence of life imprisonment with a recommended minimum term of nine years on 3 April 2008 at Cardiff Crown Court before Judge Bidder QC, for buggery, rape, indecent assault and indecency with a child).
LATHAM LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said that this case resolved the issue which arose where the offender fell to be sentenced while still serving the minimum term but where the indeterminate sentence, if imposed concurrently, could not add to the licence period before which the defendant was considered for parole and the interests of justice required a consecutive sentence. Under s 154 of the Powers of the Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000, a sentence took effect at the beginning of the day it was imposed, unless the court directed that it should commence at a different date. The sentencing regime created by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provided for clear dates on which minimum terms came to an end, to enable the court to determine when the offender might be considered for release on parole. It would be unfortunate if, in circumstances where the interests of justice required it, the court was not able to impose a sentence on an offender who was considered for parole when, subject to consideration by the parole board, the offender would not have any punishment for what could be a serious offence committed whilst in prison. There was no practical reason why an order should not be made requiring the offender to serve an additional period other than the minimum period before being considered for parole, where there had been a planned, deliberate and serious act of violence in circumstances which fully justified a significant sentence of imprisonment. Problems relating to sentencing of those serving indeterminate sentences had been considered by the Court of Appeal in the case R v O’Brien (Practice Note) [2008] 1 WLR 833 when the court considered the way in which the sentence should be constructed when indeterminate, extended and deterrent sentences had to be mixed.
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Appearances: Mark Giuliani (Richmond, Anderson, Goudie, Chester-le-Street) for the defendant Hills; Crispin Aylett QC (Crown Prosecution Service, Cleveland) for the Crown. Nerida Harford-Bell (Bindman and Partners Solicitors) for the defendant Pomfret; Paul Mytton for the Crown (Crown Prosecution Service, Droitwich). Ieuan Rees for the defendant Davies (Gartsides Solicitors, Newport); John Probert for the Crown (Crown Prosecution Service, South Wales).
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