| Coroner — Inquest — Coroner’s duties —— Coroner adjourning inquest pending criminal proceedings — Deceased’s family opposing application to adjourn — Whether power to adjourn discretionary — Whether existence of reasons not to adjourn fettering coroner’s power — Coroners Act 1988, s 16(1)(b) — Human Rights Act 1998, Sch 1, Pt 1, art 2 — Coroners Rules 1984 (SI 1984/552), r 27
R (Pereira) v HM Coroner for Inner South London and others
QBD: Laws LJ and Mitting J: 14 June 2007
A coroner’s power to adjourn an inquest under s 16(1)(b) of the Coroner’s Act 1988 was discretionary. Where a reason not to adjourn had been established, a decision to do so made in the exercise of that discretion could not be impugned by way of judicial review provided that the decision had been made rationally, taking into account all relevant matters and in the light of the state’s duty to investigate a death under art 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Queens Bench Divisional Court so held, inter alia, when refusing the application of the claimant, Alessandro Pereira, for permission to proceed with a claim for judicial review of decisions of the Coroner for Inner South London on 20 September 2006 and 26 February 2007 to adjourn an inquest into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes who was killed by police officers on 22 July 2005.
The inquest was adjourned at the request of the CPS pending the conclusion of criminal proceedings against the Office of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis under ss 3 and 33 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. Those proceedings were fixed for October 2007 with a two-month time estimate. The claimant’s application was made on the ground, inter alia, that had the coroner correctly applied s 16(1)(b) he would have been compelled not to adjourn the inquest. The claimant argued, inter alia, that the wording of s 16(1)(b) made it plain that a coroner had no power to adjourn if a reason against adjourning had been established, provided the reason was not frivolous.
MITTING J said that when there were criminal proceedings other than homicide the position was governed by r 27 of the Coroners Rules 1984 and s 16 of the 1998 Act. The statutory scheme was entirely clear. S 16 did not impose a fetter on the power to adjourn. If there was a reason to the contrary, there was a discretion to adjourn. If the coroner exercised that discretion rationally and in the light of all matters and the duty to investigate under art 2 of the Convention, the decision could not be impugned by judicial review. The coroner’s analysis of the statutory obligation was correct. The reasons for adjourning were rational, took account of all matters and could not be faulted. He gave proper respect to the state’s art 2 obligations and his decision was plainly right. The inquest would be informed by the trial of the criminal charge to a greater extent than it would be otherwise. The art 2 obligation was better fulfilled by having a trial followed by an inquest than the other way round. Art 2 did not require that the inquest took place before the trial. There was no realistic prospect of concluding an inquest before the trial. For that and other reasons the application was refused.
LAWS LJ agreed and said that the construction of s 16(1)(b) urged by the claimant would entail bizarre consequences in that in a case where all the interested parties and the coroner were in favour of an adjournment, the coroner would still be obliged to refuse an adjournment if a reason was in existence. There was no sensible legislative purpose in such a state of affairs. The judgment their Lordships gave in the present case could be relied upon as a precedent notwithstanding that it was a permission application.
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