| CRIME — Crime and disorder — Anti-social behaviour order — Application to extend duration of order by variation — Whether power to vary order by extending duration — Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c 37), s 1(8)
Leeds City Council v RG
QBD: Latham LJ and Rafferty J: 9 July 2007
An anti-social behaviour order made under s 1(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 could be extended on an application to vary its terms.
The Divisional Court so held, inter alia, when allowing the appeal by way of case stated of the appellant, Leeds City Council, against the decision of magistrates sitting at Leeds Magistrates’ Court on 21 November 2006 that they had no power to extend the length of an anti-social behaviour order on an application to vary such an order.
Magistrates imposed an anti-social behaviour order pursuant to s 1(1) of the 1998 Act with a two-year duration. Shortly before its expiry, the council sought what was described as a “variation” inviting the magistrates to extend the order by three years. The magistrates refused, holding that they had no power to extend the length of the order. The question for the opinion of the court was whether the court had power pursuant to s 1(8) of the 1998 Act to vary by extending the duration of an anti-social behaviour order made pursuant to s 1(1) of the 1998 Act, as amended. S 1(8) of the 1998 Act provided that “Subject to sub-s (9) below, the applicant or the defendant may apply by complaint to the court which made an anti-social behaviour order for it to be varied or discharged by a further order...”
LATHAM LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said that whilst Scott Baker LJ was dealing with the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 in DPP v Hall [2006] 1 WLR 1000, the word “varied” which appeared in that Act appeared in precisely the same context as the word “varied” in s 1(8) of the 1998 Act. Scott Baker LJ concluded that the ordinary meaning to be given to the word in that context, which accorded with the general purpose of the 1997 Act, entitled the court to extend the period of the relevant order. There was no justification for departing from that construction. The fact that there was no appeal from any variation was a matter which caused concern but was insufficient in itself to justify a departure from the clear meaning of the subsection. On an application to vary length the applying authority would have to persuade the magistrates that it was appropriate to vary the length of the existing order rather than make an application for a new one. Although the magistrates were wrong to conclude that they had no power to vary the length of the order in question the court would expect them to be looking with some care at the justification for applying, by way of variation, for an extension of three years, as opposed to making an allocation for a fresh order. The question posed in the case stated would be answered in the affirmative. |
