| CRIME — Homicide — Murder — Joint enterprise — Principal party fatally stabbing victim — Secondary parties claiming no knowledge of principal’s intention to kill — Whether jury to be directed that secondary parties guilty only if aware that principal might have had intention to kill rather than to cause grievous bodily harm
R v Rahman and others [2007] EWCA Crim 342
CA: Hooper LJ, Gibbs and Roderick Evans JJ: 23 February 2007
There was no requirement that on the question of whether a defendant was guilty of murder on the basis of joint enterprise, a judge should direct the jury that, when considering whether the actions of the principal were within the scope of the common purpose, they should take into account that the principal might have had an intention to kill rather than an intention only to cause serious bodily harm.
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) so held when dismissing appeals by Islamur Rahman, Kamer Akram, Anjum Nisa Amin and Liaquat Ali against their convictions on 4 March 2005 in the Crown Court at Leeds (Wakerley J and a jury) of murder.
HOOPER LJ, in the reserved judgment of the court, said that the 16-year-old victim died from a stab wound to the back during an attack on him by a number of persons. Each of the defendants said in evidence that he did not have a knife, nor foresee, believe, know or realise that anyone else had a knife. It was their case that the knifeman (P) was acting beyond the scope of any joint enterprise so that they were not criminally responsible for the stabbing. On their appeals against conviction of murder it was argued that the judge should have directed the jury that when considering whether the actions of P were within the scope of the common purpose, they should convict any defendant only if they were sure he foresaw that P might have had an intention to kill rather than that he intended only to cause serious bodily harm. During the course of the appeal it was agreed that the proper approach was that reflected in the four following questions, where D, a defendant other than P who had participated in the attack, realised that one of the attackers, with intent to cause the victim really serious bodily harm, might kill him, or intended that such harm would be caused to the victim, or realised that one of the attackers might cause such harm to the victim intending to cause him such harm. (1) What was P’s act which caused the death of the victim? (eg stabbing, shooting, beating). (2) Did D realise that one of the attackers might do that act? If yes, guilty of murder; if no, go to the next question. (3) What act or acts did D realise that one of the attackers might do to cause the victim really serious injury? (4) Was that act which D realised that one of the attackers might do of a fundamentally different nature from P’s act which caused the death of the victim? If yes, not guilty of murder; if no, guilty of murder. The direction argued for would run contrary to the policy considerations relied upon by Lord Steyn in considering the certified question in R v Powell (Anthony) and the first certified question in R v English [1999] AC 1, where he said, at p 14h, “Experience has shown that joint criminal enterprises only too readily escalate into the commission of greater offences. In order to deal with this important social problem the accessory principle is needed and cannot be abolished or relaxed.” The present case was a good example of the escalation to which Lord Steyn referred. The proposed direction was rejected.
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