| CRIME — Terrorism — Collecting information — Terrorist activities planned in UK against foreign governments — Whether extending to tyrannical governments or dictators — Whether defence of “reasonable excuse” available if terrorist activities aimed at overthrow of tyrannical government — Terrorism Act 2000, ss 1, 58
R v F (Terrorism) [2007] EWCA Crim 243
CA: Sir Igor Judge, President, Forbes and Irwin JJ: 16 February 2007
Countries other than the United Kingdom, even if which were governed by tyrants and dictators, were protected by the provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 from terrorist activities organised and planned in the United Kingdom. There was no exemption from criminal liability for terrorist activities which were motivated or said to be morally justified by the alleged nobility of the terrorist cause.
The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, so held when dismissing an appeal by the defendant, F, against a ruling made by Mackay J at Woolwich Crown Court on 25 January 2007, following a preparatory hearing under s 29 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, in relation to two offences alleged to have been committed by the defendant contrary to s 58(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000. The judge ruled (1) that the meaning of “terrorism” in the 2000 Act included the use or threat of violent action even against countries which were governed by tyrants or dictators, and (2) that as a matter of law the defendant was not entitled to argue that the defence in s 58(3) of the Act permitted him to advance as a “reasonable excuse” for the possession of the documents in question that they “originated as part of an effort to change an illegal or undemocratic regime”.
SIR IGOR JUDGE P said, in the reserved judgment of the court, that the defendant was a native of Libya who had been granted asylum by the United Kingdom in 2003. His accommodation in England was raided in October 2005 and he was arrested and charged with offences contrary to s 58(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000. He was alleged to have been in possession of documents or records containing information of a kind “likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism”. It was clear from s 1 of the 2000 Act that governments of countries other than the United Kingdom were to be protected from terrorist activities organised and planned here. But Mr Robertson argued that Mackay J’s interpretation of s 1 had produced a result which meant that Parliament deviated from its obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights, and international law, by treating as terrorists individuals who opposed regimes in countries subject to dictators. In their lordships’ judgment the meaning of the phrase “a country other than the United Kingdom” in s 1(4)(d) was plain enough and they could see no reason why, given the random impact of terrorist activities, the citizens of Libya should not be protected from such activities by those resident in this country in the same way as the inhabitants of the Netherlands or the Republic of Ireland and there was nothing in the legislation which might support this distinction. The legislation did not exempt, nor make an exception, nor create a defence for, nor exculpate what some would describe as terrorism in a just cause. Such a concept was foreign to the Act. Terrorism was terrorism, whatever the motives of the perpetrators. If the prosecution were able to demonstrate that the activities and behaviour of the appellant did indeed constitute the terrorist offences alleged again him, the question then arose as to whether he had a “reasonable excuse”. The fundamental flaw with Mr Robertson’s submissions was that they depended on the proposition that a reasonable excuse for conduct which constituted a crime might be found in the commission of the very crime prohibited by the statute. If correct, that would introduce an impossible incoherence into the statutory provisions. Their lordships agreed with Mackay J’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, the defence under s 58(3) was not available “to achieve in effect a construction of the statute which was contrary …to the intention of Parliament which passed it.”
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Appearances: Geoffrey Robertson QC and Azeem Suterwalla (Tyndallwoods Solicitors, Birmingham) for the defendant; David Perry QC, Nicholas Hilliard and Rose-Marie Franton, Solicitor (Crown Prosecution Service, HQ) for the Crown. Keir Starmer QC made written submissions on behalf of Justice.
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