| HUSBAND AND WIFE — Financial provision — Lump sum — Special contribution — Proper approach — Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25
Charman v Charman
CA: Sir Mark Potter P, Thorpe and Wilson LJJ: 24 May 2007
In ancillary relief proceedings where the court was carrying out the statutory exercise under s 25 of the 1973 Act, consideration of the “sharing principle” was no longer required to be postponed until the end of the statutory exercise, and sharing had become a principle rather than a “yardstick for use as a check”.
The Court of Appeal so stated when (1) dismissing the appeal of John Robert Charman from Coleridge J who, on 27 July 2006 on an application for ancillary relief in divorce proceedings brought by Beverley Anne Charman, found the parties’ assets to be £131m and ordered, inter alia, that in full settlement the husband pay the wife a lump sum of £40 m, so that, with other assets transferred, she would hold 36.5 % of the assets; and (2) giving guidance on the application of Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618.
The husband appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that, in carrying out the statutory exercise under s 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the judge’s approach was not “serial”, namely that he had failed to work through s 25(2) line by line to arrive, by reference in particular to the husband’s “special contribution”, at a provisional quantified award to the wife, and then to cross-check it against the “yardstick” of equality; and thus the judge had made insufficient allowance for the husband’s special contribution by way of amassing a fortune.
SIR MARK POTTER P, giving the judgment of the court, said that the judge had serially considered all the factors set out in s 25 of the 1973 Act in so far as they were relevant, including the special contribution (in the sense of a contribution by one unmatched by the other, which, for the purpose of the sharing principle, should lead to a departure from equality), and he had concluded that a departure from equality was justified. That was a valid approach, although the judge would also have been entitled to consider percentages other than at the tail end of his reasoning in a context where, first, the notion of a special contribution survived, if in circumscribed form, the decision of the House of Lords in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618, and, secondly, “sharing” had become a principle rather than a yardstick. The concept was, and remained, that property should be shared equally in the absence of a good reason for departure from equality; and the special contribution was one such potential reason.
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Appearances: Barry Singleton QC, Alan Boyle QC, Deborah Eaton, Deepak Nagpal and Dakis Hagen (Withers LLP) for the husband. Martin Pointer QC, Christopher Nugee QC, James Ewins and Andrew Mold (Manches LLP) for the wife.
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