THE LAW vs LITERATURE Part 1

Obscenity

by Paul Magrath
 
There are various ways in which literature can come into conflict with the law. One of them is for a book to be accused of obscenity. Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and James Joyce’s Ulysses are just two of the classic novels whose suppression or censorship has been attempted on this ground. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the publication of another such victim, Hubert Selby’s Last Exit to Brooklyn, a minor cult classic which, while not in the same artistic league, gave rise to the leading case on the law of obscenity, Regina v Calder & Boyars Ltd [1969] 1 QB 151.

A prosecution was brought under the Obscene Publications Act 1959, which provides by section 1(1) that “an article shall be deemed to be obscene” if “taken as a whole” it “tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely ... to read it”.


But by section 4(1) a person who publishes such an article “shall not be convicted” under the Act “if it is proved that publication of the article ... is justified for the public good on the ground that it is in the interests of science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of general concern”.

But by section 4(1) a person who publishes such an article “shall not be convicted” under the Act “if it is proved that publication of the article ... is justified for the public good on the ground that it is in the interests of science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of general concern”.

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The combined effect of these provisions is to create an absurd paradox. How can something be justified as being for the public good if its tendency is to deprave and corrupt? Is it like eating a cream cake, or too many chocolates: “naughty but nice”? Or is it more like those products of the “decadent” artistic imagination, as to which the damnably quotable Oscar Wilde remarked: “There is no such thing as a moral or immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all.”

Wilde was fond of paradoxes and in a different context (ie his trial for gross indecency) might have welcomed a defence of literary merit, as applied to his own conduct. What he would have made of Last Exit to Brooklyn must remain a matter of conjecture but another controversial writer, Anthony Burgess, in his introduction to the post-trial edition of Selby’s novel, describes it as  “a serious study of certain painful and shocking aspects of Western city life”.


It is not so much a novel as a set of linked stories about the hookers, hustlers, petty gangsters and decidedly hard-boiled drag queens inhabiting a seamy hinterland of the eponymous New York borough. There’s a lot of drink and drugs and profanity; there’s also some fairly breathtaking violence, including a horrific gang-rape; but “taken as a whole” (in the words of section 1) it has a strong flavour of 1950s pulp fiction and by current standards seems quaintly dated. It was subsequently made into a “cult” film (ie failed to secure major distributor).

The publisher, John Calder, was himself no stranger to controversy. An earlier novel published by his firm, Alexander Trocchi’s Cain’s Book, a harrowing portrayal of drug addiction, was successfully prosecuted under the 1959 Act, the Divisional Court ruling that obscenity was not confined to matters of sex:  see John Calder (Publications) Ltd v Powell [1965] 1 QB 509. 

Of the high profile prosecutions in the decade which followed the 1959 Act, probably the most famous was R v Penguin Books Ltd [1961] Crim LR, which concerned the publication of an unexpurgated paperback edition of Lady Chatterley’s Lover by D H Lawrence. For a full account of the case, see The Trial of Lady Chatterley by C H Rolph (1961), extracts from which were published as a Pocket Penguin only last year.

The numerous expert witnesses for the defence included Rebecca West, E M Forster and Cecil Day Lewis. The jury may have been impressed by these literary luminaries; or they may simply have been put off by the patronising tone of prosecuting counsel, Mervyn Griffith-Jones, asking them: “Is it a book that you would even wish your wife or your servants to read?” No wonder the publisher’s acquittal seems in retrospect to have ushered in the social as well as sexual liberation of the 1960s.

Penguin having been acquitted, it was not until the Calder & Boyars case [1969] 1 QB 151 that the “literary merit” defence under section 4 of the 1959 Act received judicial consideration at appellate level. The Court of Appeal was evidently aware of the paradox it created, observing at p 168: “The legislature can hardly have contemplated that a book which tended to corrupt and deprave the average reader or the majority of those likely to read it could be justified as being for the public good on any ground.”

The court’s solution to the paradox was a classic bit of judicial re-wiring. First, on the question of obscenity under section 1, the jury should be directed to consider whether the effect of the book is to tend to deprave and corrupt a significant proportion of those persons likely to read it (my emphasis): see p 168.
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Then, if they do so find (beyond reasonable doubt), they should consider the number of readers likely to be depraved and corrupted, the strength of the tendency and the nature of the depravity and corruption, and weigh those factors against the strength of the book’s literary, sociological or ethical merit to decide whether, on a balance of probabilities, the section 4 defence is made out: see p 172. The publishers’ appeal was allowed because the judge’s directions, though well meant, failed to thread the jury through the paradoxical maze and led to a miscarriage of justice.

The 1959 Act replaced what had been the common law offence of obscene libel, the test of which was very similar to that in section 1: see R v Hicklin (1868) LR 3 QB 360, 371. But the absence of a defence of literary merit under the common law made for a more logical approach to the issue of obscenity, as can be seen from a case decided shortly before the new Act: see R v Martin Secker Warburg Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 1138. In his summing up the trial judge, Stable J,  made continual references to art and literature, in essence directing the jury that a work having literary merit was by definition not obscene. The jury evidently agreed: they acquitted the publishers.  Having dutifully read The Philanderer all the way through, I would not say Stanley Kauffman’s depiction of a mean-spirited adulterer is a great novel, but neither is it, in Stable J’s definition of pornography, at p 1143,  “the filth, bawdy muck that is just filth for filth’s sake”.

To say that a work cannot be obscene if it has literary merit seems to me more logical than to say, as the 1959 Act requires, that it is obscene, but at same time has literary merit. The problem with the logical approach is presumably that it requires the Crown to establish lack of literary merit as an ingredient of obscenity, and perhaps that is rather difficult, especially when in artistic terms “anything goes”. The section 4 solution, which puts the burden on the defence, but creates an absurd paradox as a result, bears all the hallmarks of a Great British Fudge.

Despite this, or perhaps because of the “clarification” provided by the Court of Appeal in the Calder & Boyars case, the section 4 defence does not seem to have caused problems in subsequent obscenity cases. Another famous one, coming at the end of the decade after the Act, concerned the lewdly satirical “Oz” magazine: see R v Anderson [1972] 1 QB 304. According to Tony Palmer, author of The Trials of Oz (1971), it was “the longest obscenity trial in history”.


The editors had invited some schoolchildren to help put the underground magazine together, and argued, for the purpose of section 4, that “It is in the public interest that schoolchildren should be able to express themselves freely” and to provide some “insight into how schoolchildren think and observe” (see p 307). This interesting argument was never fully tested because the appeal was allowed on a different point.

The judge had misdirected the jury in defining “obscene” as including the dictionary sense of “repulsive, filthy, loathsome or lewd”: he should have said the sole test was tendency to deprave and corrupt under section 1.

Subsequent case law on the 1959 Act has tended to concentrate on non-literary publications, typically pornographic magazines (whose “psychological benefit” in relieving the sexual tensions of certain individuals was held not to amount to a defence of public good under section 4 in DPP v Jordan [1977] AC 699) and websites (such as the coprophiliac one for which no defence under section 4 was even attempted in R v Perrin [2002] EWCA Crim 747). Those having a tendency to be depraved and corrupted need no longer pore over controversial novels to get their perverted thrills: they can limit their researches to more fruitful (or saucy) sources. And if any work of genuine literature should happen to stray across the prosecutor’s desk, why, there is nothing quite like a section 4 defence of literary merit to cast a pall of respectability over the whole book and so deter any would-be pervert from even bothering with it.

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