Spencer-Franks v Kellogg Brown and Root Ltd and another: [2008] UKHL 46

HL(Sc): Lord Hoffmann, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Carswell, Lord Mance and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury: 2 July 2008

The pursuer, who was employed as a mechanical technician on an offshore oil rig, was injured while repairing the closer device for the door of the central control room. The closer consisted of a spring mechanism attached to the door and connected by a linkage arm to the door frame. The linkage arm had sprung loose and struck the pursuer in the face causing him to lose four teeth. The pursuer claimed the defenders were in breach of their obligations under regulations 2 and 3 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 to ensure that work equipment was suitable for use. The defenders took pleas of relevancy on the ground that the door closer could not be “work equipment” within the meaning of the Regulations. The sheriff found that the door closer was work equipment but the Court of Session held that it was not and dismissed the action.

The pursuer appealed.

The House of Lords held:
The 1998 Regulations were intended to implement the Work Equipment Directive (Council Directive 89/655/EEC). The definition of work equipment in the Directive was “any machine, apparatus, tool or installation used at work”. The definition in the 1998 Regulations used the words “for use at work”. The domestic definition required one to ascertain the purpose of the apparatus etc. What was it for? If it was for use at work, then it was work equipment. If one took that simple approach then the answer was clear. Everyone using the control room was using it for the purposes of their work. They used the door to enter or leave the control room. And in doing so, they used the closer. Its purpose was for use at work. Giving the definition its ordinary meaning, the closer was work equipment. An alterative approach based upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hammond v Comr of Police of the Metropolis [2004] ICR 1467 was wrong. Something could not be work equipment in relation to one person but not to another. The Directive did not say that work equipment had to have been made available to the particular employee who had been injured. It spoke of the equipment being made available to “workers in the undertaking”. That meant all or any of the workers in the undertaking. When one was considering the persons to whom the equipment had been made available, the relevant unit was the undertaking and not the particular worker. The 1998 Regulations should be interpreted to accord with the principle stated in the Directive.

The appeal was allowed.

Appearances: Angus Stewart QC and Jan McCall (Drummond Miller LLP, Edinburgh) for the pursuer; Colin Macaulay QC and Roderick Dunlop (HBM Sayers, Glasgow) for the defenders.